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Klarhorst 1
INTRODUCTION
As the Weimar Republic deteriorated and Adolf Hitler rose in popularity, individual church
leaders, like Dietrich Bonhoeffer, began to worry. Others, like Martin Niemoller, rejoiced at first,
thinking that Hitler could restore Germany to its former glory, but changed their opinions and
denounced Hitler's government when the Nazis attacked the churches. What motivated those two
men and others to stand up for what they believed, and what obstacles did they overcome in order
to be heard? To fully understand their story and the story of the Confessional Church in Nazi
Germany, it is necessary to look at some of the history of Germany.
After Germany had to accept defeat in World War I and sign the Versailles Treaty, including
provisions that declared Germany responsible for beginning the war, the political situation was
unstable. The Weimar Republic, which officially began on November 9, 1918, was based on a

.

new constitution which confirmed Germany's transition from monarchy to democracy. This
fledgling democracy had to deal with the consequences of a lost war--the reparation payments, the
loss in prestige and a reduced army that was virtually incapacitated (Lutzer, Hitler's Cross 30-31 ).
The economic situation was difficult after the war; with massive unemployment and industrial
dislocation, causing Germany to default on its reparation payments. The French occupation of the
industrial Rhineland in 1923, began to exact reparations, caused the economy to collapse
completely, with inflation robbing people of their savings and causing hardship for many. The
situation did not improve much until 1925-1929 when, for a brief period, it finally seemed as iflife
was returning to normal. But this trend was short lived as the Great Depression hit Germany with
tremendous force in 1930. As hundreds of thousands of Germans lost their jobs and there was no
hope to be found anywhere, the people grew desperate (Lutzer, Hitler's Cross 31-33).
During this time AdolfHitler, an Austrian born in 1889, had actively sought to gain political
control. In 1923 he launched an uprising to take charge of the Bavarian state government in
Southern Germany with hopes of marching on Berlin, but his revolution failed. His prison
sentence convinced him to pursue legal avenues to power. His message in the later 1920s and
early 1930s was that Germany could be revived stronger than ever, and that the Treaty of
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Versailles was an immoral document. When elections were held in 1932, Hitler's party became the
largest in the Reichstag, but still lacked a majority. Less than one year later, in January 1933,
Hitler was appointed chancellor. From this position, he manipulated the Reichstag to gain a
majority for his and other rightwing parties (Lutzer, Hitler's Cross 33).
After February 27, 193 3, the Reich stag building in Berlin burned. Goring, the Prussian
Minister of the Interior, blamed the German communist party for hiring a Dutchman, Marinus van
der Lubbe, to commit arson, and ordered the arrests of many Jews and communists in conjuction
with the fire (Chronik 1933 2). Although Hitler's party was not responsible for the incident, Hitler
pressured President von Hindenburg to bypass Parliament and "sign a decree [. . .] that suspended
individual liberties" (Lutzer, Hitler's Cross 33). By using illegal means, Hitler finally reached a
two-thirds majority, allowing him to amend the constitution, transferring all legislative power to

.

himself and proclaiming the NSDAP the only legal party in the country by July 1933. When
President von Hindenburg died on August 2, 1934, Hitler proclaimed himselfPresident and
Chancellor, calling himself Der Fuhrer. Free from the slow-moving processes of a democracy,
Hitler moved ahead to improve the country. The economy which had begun to pick up
momentum in 1932 continued to strengthen under his leadership, restoring the Germans' faith in
themselves and in their country, even though he stabilized the economy through primarily
inflationary means. He improved the infrastructure nationwide, renewed conscription and, most
importantly, marched his troops into the French occupied Ruhr area and took it away from them,
thus obliterating the Treaty of Versailles and erasing the humiliation suffered over a decade earlier
(Lutzer, Hitler's Cross 33-34, 17).
The situation of the German Church was just as troubling as the political and economic
situation during the Weimar Republic--with one exception. After the war, small theological
brotherhoods formed throughout Germany. Their membership consisted predominantly of pastors
and theologians whose main purpose was prayer, meditation, scholarly work and exchange of
ideas (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarremotbund 8). Their theology was based on Christ, unlike the
dominant theology in Germany characterized by liberal thinking and higher criticism.
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Representative of the latter kind of thinking was Ludwig Feuerbach, a theologian who argued that
"man is God" (Lutzer, Hitler's Cross 29). Elevating man and oppressing God's unique character
and holiness became the tenor of the day. The Church was furthermore very fragmented.
Although many had dreamed of unifying the Church since 1848, it had never been achieved, and
the Church in its structure was allowed to stand unchanged for over a century. There was little
cooperation beyond the regional level. The twenty-eight Landeskirchen (regional Protestant
churches) were only loosely connected with each other or the rest of the churches (Stegmann, Der
Kirchenkampf in_der Thiiringer Evangelischen Kirche 1933-1945 17). Influenced by Hegelian
philosophy that denied the deity of Christ and rejected the Old Testament because of its Jewish
context, and influenced by Nietzsche who had said God was dead, the German Church was weak
and unprepared for the battle it had to fight (Lutzer, Hitler's Cross 26-44). Had there been a
stronger, Christ-centered theology, as well as a stronger open dialogue between the churches, the

.

German Church would have been better equipped to face the challenging times ahead.
For some Landeskirchen, the struggle began earlier than for others, when church elections in
1932 saw major Nazi involvement. Not only did the Nazi leadership encourage people to
nominate members of the National Socialists, "but also to approve of those suggestions only if it
could be guaranteed that after the elections two thirds of those voted into clerical positions would
be Nazis" (y/. Niemoller, Kampfund Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 26). The objective of the
Nazis was to eradicate those liberal tendencies that had led to pacifism and a global Christian
worldview. Those people who accepted these beliefs and joined the Nazi supported churches
were known as Deutsche Christen and will be referred to from here on as German Christians--a
term that was coined by Hitler himself (y/. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden
Kirche 26-27). Doris Bergen would probably consider Niemoller's definition of the German
Christians as too simple. She points out in her book Twisted Cross that die-hard Nazis like
"Martin Bormann and Heinrich Himmler, as well as Adolf Hitler himself, considered Nazism and
Christianity irreconcilable antagonists " (Doris Bergen, Twisted Cross 1). Furthermore, she points
out that the German Christians were neither a unified front nor well-liked by the National
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Socialists (Doris Bergen, Twisted Cross 2, 7). Bergen agrees though that the German Christians
were the "main rival" (Doris Bergen, Twisted Cross 12) of the Confessional Church.

THE GERMAN AND CONFESSIONAL CHURCHES IN 1933
Whereas trouble, caused by the Nazi takeover, in 1932 was still limited, the year 1933
marked the beginning of serious problems for Germany in general and the Church in particular.
After becoming Chancellor at the end of January, Hitler moved fast to consolidate his power. In
March he issued new decrees, which effectively neutralized democracy in Germany, curtailing
freedom of speech and freedom of the press. He also legalized the confiscations of property and
house searches, and, in addition, prohibited people from meeting freely (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer
46). The Ermiichtigungsgesetz (Enabling Act) gave Hitler and his party unlimited powers and the

.

first "brutal attacks" against communists, Jews, union members and Social Democrats followed
(Stegmann, Der Kirchenkampfin der Thiiringer Evangelischen Kirche 1933-1945 14). In April
an appeal went to the people to boycott Jewish stores, and the Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des

Berufsbeamtentums--an anti-Jewish law to restore civil service with tenure that forced Jews to
resign from positions in the civil service (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 47)--was implemented. In late
July Hitler reached a concordat, an agreement between the Pope and the German government for
the regulation of church affairs with the Vatican (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 130), legitimizing his rule.
The changes in the political realm affected the church tremendously. Although Protestants
and Catholics alike tried to address government issues, both groups fought separate battles. On
March 23, 193 3, Hitler had promised during a speech in Parliament that "the national government
sees both of the Christian confessions as the most important factors for the preservation of our
national traditions" and that "the rights of the churches would not be reduced, [and that] their
positions toward the nation would not be changed" (yv. Niemoller, Kirchenkampfim Dritten

Reich 4).
Even though Hitler's words sounded hopeful, one man had already begun to question the
integrity of the new politcal leader. Dietrich Bonhoeffer questioned the motives of the
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government as soon as the Aryan-paragraph, which called for a boycott of Jewish businesses, had
been published on April 7. Going beyond addressing the new directive as it applied to the church,
he questioned it as it applied to the state as well. He wrote an essay, entitled "Die Kirche vor der

Judenfrage," (The Church and the Jewish Question) in which he not only discussed "the question
of church membership of Jews, but also their human rights in the German state" (Bethge,

Bonhoeffer 47). He was about the only one to address both issues, since the Confessional Church
later only addressed the former and not the latter issue (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 47). Bonhoeffer
always hoped to get the churches to begin acting and doing something, but few leaders were ready
to challenge Hitler. When a new church constitution was passed on July 14, 1933, it seemed to
validate Hitler's speech from March 23 . It began with the words, "The inviolable basis of the
German evangelical church is the Gospel of Jesus Christ ... " (W. Niemoller, Kirchenkampf im

.

Dritten R eich 4). Unfortunately, events had already taken place that gave those words a hollow
nng.

Toward the end of May, Pastor Friedrich von Bodelschwingh was appointed Reichsbishop.
He was well-known as a man of God who had followed in his father's footsteps as a pastor and as
the leader of an institution for disabled people, especially epileptics. Von Bodelschwingh accepted
his new position quite aware of the difficult task ahead of him in trying to reform and unify the
Protestant Church on a national level. Upon taking office, he received letters of support from
individuals as well as groups; however, the Nazis were not willing to accept his leadership. Their
candidate for that position had been Ludwig Muller, a confidant of Hitler in church affairs. To
ensure that Muller would become Reichsbishop, they fanned the flame of controversy in the
churches and in public, using government control of newpapers to publish pro-Muller articles. An
article in the So/diner Tagesblatt (June lOth, 1933), for example, showed clearly how political one
particular church had become, with references to groups within the NSDAP and the SA protesting
against v. Bodelschwingh and supporting Muller (HA 2/39-5).
In addition to the continual bad publicity and controversy, people who had previously pledged

their support to v. Bodelschwingh began withdrawing that support in light of the negative impact
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the whole affair had on the unity of the churches. One pastor wrote to the Reichsbishop asking
him to resign his position since "[Muller] is an old national socialist and has the absolute trust of
AdolfHitler" (HA 2/39-5, letter dated Tubingen, 8. June 1933). Another pastor expressed his
hope that "the national socialistic movement should be won for the church, but that that could only
work when they [the German Christians] could elect the Reichsbishop from among their own
group, or if Hitler would show a vote of confidence [for v. Bodelschwingh]." The same pastor
continued asking v. Bodelschwingh to contact Hitler and ask for his help, or to suggest Muller for
the office himself (HA 2/39-5).
The Nazis continued their attempts to unseat v. Bodelschwingh by forcing influential church
officials who supported the new Reichsbishop into silence. It is questionable what would have
happened had v. Bodelschwingh stayed in office. His views were moderate and attracted many

.

Germans who saw no fault with his ideas, but who also saw no fault with Hitler's ideas either. On
one hand, this could have resulted in a larger grassroots movement unlike the Confessional Church
which later emerged. On the other hand, it could have resulted in a large organization with weak,
watered down theology for the Protestant Church. In any case, v. Bodelschwingh resigned in June
when the General Superintendent in Prussia was removed from his office, the President of the

Kirche der Altpreussischen Union (Church of the Old Prussian Union) resigned (W. Niemoller,
Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 4 7), and when the appointment of Staatskommissar
(State Commissioner) August Jager caused a major collapse of his support. Jager's appointment
to office proved especially detrimental. According to Wihelm Niemoller, "Jager proceeded
immediately to dissolve church representations and to appoint [Nazi] authorized representatives"

(Kirchenkampf im Dritten Reich 5). To understand properly the impact of Jager's appointment, a
look at one of his written circular letters to the chief administrators and police presidents in
Prussia will suffice. He justified the intervention of the state into operations of the churches by
stating that "intervention was necessary because the confusing situation was about to threaten the
nation's unity which Adolf Hitler had created" (HA2/39-44). Jager continued:
... the state--in its own interest--cannot tolerate resistance of either church or nation, that
such attempt at resistance is rather to be viewed as treason against the nation and the

Klarhorst 7
state, [and that he therefore] requests that [they, the chief administrators and police
presidents] pay particular attention that his orders as well as those of his official
representatives will not be sabotaged. Such an attempt would have to be considered
revolt and rebellion against the state's authority which had to be suppressed immediately.
[ ... ] It is for example not allowed that protests are published in local church bulletins, or
that clerics are told [as had happened with their previous leadership] to voice protests in
form of requests for prayers for the opressed church. (HA 2/3 9-44)
When Jager's appointment was discussed among Niemoller and his colleagues, Bonhoeffer
suggested they refuse performing burials for as long as Jager remained in office. However nobody
thought such a strategy could be effective, and therefore it was not tried (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer
48).
Within weeks after v. Bodelschwingh's resignation and Jager's appointment, nationwide
church elections were held in late July, and the German Christians received approximately 75% of
all the votes. However, Muller did not become Reichsbishop until late September (E. Bethge,

Bonhoeffer 131) because of his association with a radical pastor named Joachim Hossenfelder
whose extreme views irritated many Christians (yv. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der

Bekennenden Kirche 27). This forced leaders at the highest level of the German Christians to
separate Muller from Hossenfelder's extreme views of the Church. But the rifts within the
churches were already open and deepening. Pastors and church associations protested against
being dissolved and demanded cooperation with v. Bodelschwingh. In order to heal those rifts, v.
Bodelschwingh had stepped down, but the damage was done--not only among those churches who
opposed the German Christians, but also among the German Christians themselves. Their
supposed united movement split into different groups in varying in degrees of extremism (yv.
Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 47).
The results of the elections caused mixed reactions among the German Christians, but
especially among those opposed to the Nazi-supported church. One of the results was that the

Jungreformatoren (Young Reformers) "withdrew from church politics" (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer
131). Some people considered this group as a precursor to the Bekennende Kirche (Confessional
Church).
According to Wilhelm Niemoller, the Jungreformatoren was a group of people that had
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gathered all those around them who opposed the German Christians. However, this group lacked
theological soundness and determination to reject the new theology and the Fuhrer idea.
Martin Niemoller, head of administration for the Jungrejormatoren at the time, composed sixteen
theses which he read on August 2, during a meeting of the Jungreformatoren questioning the
validity of the July elections (yr/. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 11 ). When the Prussian
General Synod, dominated by the German Christians, changed statutes within the church without
allowing the minority groups to voice their opinions, Martin Niemoller sent a letter to
approximately three thousand pastors, almost all of them members of the Jungreformatoren. In his
letter Niemoller addressed the issues raised by the synod and announced the establishment of an
organization to help pastors stay true to the authority of scripture and Jesus Christ alone. Another
result of the synod was that six general-superintendents were forced into retirement in Old Prussia,
which caused tremendous confusion and tension among the churches in that part of the state (yr/.

.

Niemoller, Der Pjarrernotbund 2-3).
When the German Christians held their synod, known as the Brown Synod, on September 5,
1933, it became obvious that those opposing them needed to unite more than ever before. During
this particular synod the legal status of clerics was redefined. It was argued that only a man who
was completely committed to the German Evangelical Church (with the German Christian style
theology) and to the German nation could be called to become a pastor or priest. This same
change in legal status called for those pastors who were non-Aryan--clerics and civil servants who
were either non-Aryans themselves or married to a non-Aryan to be fired (W. Niemoller, Der

Pfarrernotbund 12-13).
One day after the synod, Martin Niemoller and Dietrich Bonhoeffer worked on a statement
regarding the Aryan-paragraph. On September 11, sixty pastors signed what became known as
the Berliner Siitze (Berlin Statements). The statements consisted of the Niemoller and
Bonhoeffer's statement and the Rheinisch-Westfiilischen Siitzen (Rhine-Westphalian Statements)
which had been developed by two different brotherhoods (yr/. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund
15). As already mentioned the brotherhoods were formed after World War I by pastors and
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theologians who devoted themselves to prayer, meditation, scholarly work and exchange of ideas.
Over the course of the summer, while the v. Bodelschwingh controversy raged in the
spotlight, brotherhoods in the regions of the Rhineland and Westphalia worked steadily in
developing their theology. Thousands of copies of the Berliner Satze were sent to pastors as
early as September 12. On September 15, Martin Niemoller travelled to Bethel near Bielefeld to
win Pastor v. Bodelschwingh's support for a new organization called the Pfarrernotbund (Pastors'
Emergency Association, which some seas the nucleus of the Confessional Church. Although v.
Bodelschwingh welcomed the new organization he refused to accept the leadership position (W.
Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 15-17).
Von Bodelschwingh was not the only one of the older generation in the church leadership who
refused to join the new association. After v. Bodelschwingh's refusal, Martin Niemoller

.

approached the Bishop of Hanover, Dr. August Marahrens, to offer him the leadership position,
but Marahrens refused as well. Aware of what was at stake and realizing that leadership was
needed immediately, Martin Niemoller, then forty-one years old, finally agreed to accept the
responsibility of the leadership position. On September 19, Martin Niemoller asked pastors again
to join the new association (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 16-18). By 1938 the
Pastors Emergency Association would count 4,952 members, just over 20% of the number of
active pastors (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund, Preface).
On October 20, seven men, including Martin Niemoller, were chosen as members of the
Bruderrat (Council ofBrothers), with the authority to determine the association's general course
of action as well as the authority to represent the group officially. An eighth member was
added in early November. The Bruderrat shared equally in decision making, and Niemoller's vote
did not bear any more weight than any one of the others. One of the reasons for their joint
decision making was not only accountability, but also the desire to avoid the Fuhrer principle
which held Germany in its relentless grip (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 20-21).
Contact among the pastors in the association was kept by circular letters, which began on
November 2, 1933, and ended on February 9, 1935. In the early letters, Martin Niemoller
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requested input from pastors to help formulate a unified creed or profession of faith that would
serve as guideline for pastors and ultimately would have the same weight as a pastor's ordination
vows. Although one of the first versions was already developed in November of 1933, it would
not be until after the Barmen Synod in 1934 that a version was agreed upon. Once the unified
version was accepted, the Rote Karte (red card), as it became known, would be signed not only by
pastors, but also by individual members of the congregations f'N. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund
22-27). The beginning ofthe Confessional Church is somewhat obscure, although it was
intimately connected to the person of Martin Niemoller. Since it would not be until the Synod of
Barmen that the groups working together would officially refer to themselves as the Confessional
Church, this paper follows further events surrounding NiemoiJer's organization.
The Pastors' Emergency Association's membership rose to over seven thousand members

.

within the first four months of its existence. Unfortunately, that number dropped steadily due to
an inability of the different Protestant confessions to work persistently and productively together.
Church politics only added to the difficulties rather than helped solve them (W. Niemoller, Der
Pfarrernotbund 31 ). On September 27, the German Christians held their national synod at the
town of Wittenberg during which Ludwig Muller was to be elected as Reichsbishop. Twenty-two
men, among them Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Martin Niemoller and Friedrich Muller, planned to voice
their opinions. The latter, on behalf of two thousand pastors, wrote a statement addressed to the
national synod. The document criticized the new regulations, the paganizing of the Gospel and the
Aryan-paragraph among others. "None of the present church representatives felt courageous
enough to read the statement aloud, therefore Fritz Muller and his friends nailed copies of the
statement to trees and church doors"

f'N. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 32).

Almost a month

later, on November 11 , three members of the Pastors' Emergency Association, including Martin
Niemoller, were suspended until further notice by the Berliner Konsistorium. It would take five
days before the three men could again continue their work in an offical capacity f'N. Niemoller,
Der Pfarrernotbund 35).
A long-planned event took place in the Sportpalast (a sports arena) in Berlin on Novemberl3.
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The German Christians held a meeting for all the members demanding continued changes within
the church and its theology. Among other things, they insisted on rejecting the Old Testament,
judging it inferior in quality and morality to the New Testament, and refused Pauline theology
regarding the sinfulness of mankind (W. Niemoller, Der Pjarrernotbund 38-39). Furthermore the
German Christians demanded that the anti-Jewish laws, issued in April, should be enforced
everywhere in the country (Chronik 1933 7).
Martin Niemoller reacted to the German Christians' demands in a letter to the Pastors'
Emergency Association informing the ministers of the content of the meeting in Berlin and asking
them to read a statement to their churches on November 19 at church services. Three ofthe
pastors who complied with Niemoller's request were suspended. Their names were listed in
another ofNiemoller's circular letters with the request for intercessory prayer for these three

.

pastors by name. This type of intercession would become the distinguishing mark of the Pastors'
Emergency Association and later of the Confessional Church. It would be a mark of distinction
that the Nazis would severely punish wherever they found it (W. Niemoller, Der Pjarrernotbund
42-43). Despite additional repeated meetings between members of the Pastors' Emergency
Association with Reichsbishop Miiller and Secretary of Church Affairs Weber nothing essentially
changed, until finally on December 21 , Joachim Hossenfelder resigned temporarily from his offical
duties within the German Christian Church (W. Niemoller, Der Pjarrernotbund 39-42).
Even though the German Christians tried to retain control with the help of the police who
prohibited meetings and the distribution ofleaflets, the month ofDecember did not go well for
them. On December 2, Muller introduced a new clerical department. The next day he was forced
to cancel the festivities that should have accompanied his official acceptance of his new position as
Reichsbishop. Over the next four weeks, he was dealt repeated blows as all four members of the
new clerical department resigned their positions. Technically the church was again without
legitimate leadership, but Muller remained in office. By mid-December he was not only facing
opposition from the Pastors' Emergency Association, but also from those Lutheran bishops who
were not German Christians, and who informed him on December 19 that in order to preserve the

Klarhorst 12
unity of the German Evangelical Church, they could no longer consider his orders as
authoritatively binding. One day later he received a letter from the Pastors' Emergency
Association, now with a membership of six thousand pastors, expressing that its members no
longer placed any confidence in the Reichsbishop's abilities to bring peace to the German
Evangelical Church unless the clerical department's crisis could be resolved by December 23, and
the problems within the church could be dealt with in a truly Christian manner (W. Niemoller, Der
Pfarrernotbund 43-46). By the end of 1933, the lines between the German Christians and the
Confessional Church were drawn. Nobody on either side expected a quick or easy end to the
conflict.

THE GERMAN AND CONFESSIONAL CHURCHES IN 1934

.

The year 1934 began with a clear attempt by Reichsbishop Muller to silence any opposition to
the German Christians, clearly revoking his action of the last month, when he was forced, on
December 6, to publicly withdraw his support from them. His "decree regarding the
reestablishment of order in the German Evangelical Church" was later referred to as "muzzling
order" since it was a clear attempt to silence the pastors (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 47).
Muller defended his decision with the statement that the rifts within the church endangered
national unity as well as the spread of the Gospel. A closer look at the decree revealed though
that its main focus was to silence organized opposition in the churches. Church services were now
for preaching only. Church officials including deacons and pastors were neither allowed to
become involved in church politics by passing out printed material nor to use church facilities for
any type of meetings related to church politics. Violators would be penalized with immediate
temporary suspension and salary cuts of at least one third. Finally, violators would be formally
charged with legal infractions and, once judged guilty, would be permanently removed from their
positions (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 47-48). It is obvious that the "muzzling order" was
very effective in hindering pastors to connect with each other and their congregations regarding
the situation of the church in general.
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Martin Niemoller reacted immediately and wrote a statement which he passed on to the
Association. Difficulties with the postal service resulted in a delay; as a result, many pastors read
the statement in their churches on January 14 instead ofJanuary 7. One particular detail is worth
mentioning. According to Niemoller, a meeting had taken place in Halle between several leaders
of Landeskirchen on January 4 . Those leaders who did not belong to the German Christians had
come together to discuss how they could compel the Reichsbishop to keep promises he had made
in previous weeks. Muller led the participants of the meeting to believe that a decision would be
made soon. This message caused them to forgo any action until they heard from him again. On
the same day he published his "muzzling order" (W. Niemoller, Der Pjarrernotbund 49-50).
Muller obviously played his cards well. By appealing to the undecided leaders in the
Protestant church for patience, he silenced them effectively long enough to push through his
agenda. With the sam~ strike he not only silenced temporarily the leaders, but also those people
the leaders represented, causing an attitude of cautious waiting. Persecution increased in midJanuary, but thousands of pastors had read the statement. Although not all of them could be
suspended and tried, many pastors everywhere were indeed dealt with in that manner (W.
Niemoller, Dr Pjarrernotbund 50-51).
The Pastors' Emergency Association was increasingly monitored for political activity by the
Gestapo. Officials in the government hoped that Niemoller and his friends would lose support
among the population and tried to defame them and their organization. One of the reasons the
government was interested in the group's supposed political activity was an upcoming meeting
with Hitler and prominent leaders of the church. Naturally the Secret Police were most interested
in information that could be distorted to the government's advantage (W. Niemoller, Der

Pjarrernotbund 51-53). As it turned out later, tapping phone lines of members ofthe Pastors'
Emergency Association, especially of Martin Niemoller, was also ordered (W. Niemoller, Kampf

und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 88).
Herman Goring, "Prussian Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Prussian Police and
Gestapo" (Goring, Hermann 1), used part of the gathered information to "set up a stage worthy
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performance," at least according to Wilhelm Niemoller, who called the meeting with Hitler a
disaster for the Confessional Church (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 53). In his book,

Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche, NiemoUer gives more particulars about the incident.
Several men representing different groups attended the meeting. Hitler, GOring, and the Minister
for the Interior, Frick, represented the government. Several German Christian bishops of the
Landeskirchen~

several Reichsleiter, and finally members of what was still growing into the

Confessional Church were the other participants. The latter group included, among others, state
bishop Marahrens who, as already mentioned, had refused to lead the Pastors' Emergency
Association, state bishop Theophil Wurm, and Martin Niemoller (W. NiemoUer, Kampf und

Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 88).
When NiemoUer addressed Hitler, he pointed out that he was solely interested in "'the welfare

.

of the church, the state, and the German people"' (Lutzer, Hitler's Cross 130). Hitler's comment
to Niemoller's statement was "'You confine yourself to the Church. I'll take care of the German
people"' (Lutzer, Hitler's Cross 131 ). Niemoller addressed Hitler one more time when taking
leave saying: '"You said that 'I will take care of the German people.' But we too, as Christians and
churchmen, have a responsibility toward the German people. That responsibility was entrusted to
us by God, and neither you nor anyone in this world has the power to take it from us"' (Lutzer,

Hitler's Cross 131 ). This last comment obviously did not please Hitler at all and as a result
Niemoller was repeatedly interrogated by Secret Police agents during the next few days, while
Reichsbishop Muller began negotiations with the state bishops "promising them the appointment
of a new clerical department, the separation of church and state, and to take a liberal approach
toward interpreting the enforcement ofthe muzzling order" (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis

der Bekennenden Kirche 89).
The result of that meeting came as a shock to Niemoller and the members of the Pastor
Emergency Association. On October 27, it became public knowledge that those state bishops,
who were neither active members of the German Christians nor members of the Pastors'
Emergency Association, had crossed the lines and unanimously supported the Reichsbishop. The
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German Christians enjoyed their victory and did their utmost to use it to their advantage in the
media (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 89).
However, the German Christians had stretched the truth. The state bishops had only agreed
to support the Reichsbishop, because they thought they could hold him to his promises, like the
promise that the state bishops would be included more often in decision making and church
politics. Unfortunately, they had only Moller's verbal promises, but nothing in writing (W.
Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 55). The state bishops "' did not only declare their absolute
loyalty to the Third Reich and its Fuhrer,"' but they also "'utterly condemned all active criticism of
the state, nation ... "' (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 55). This move by the state bishops
was very damaging indeed because it gave the public a negative impression of the Pastors'
Emergency Association, seeing it more as a group of trouble-makers rather than as pastors

.

fighting for the right to preach a pure, undiluted Gospel.
It appeared as if the month of January would end with a major victory for the German

Christians and Reichsbishop MOller. On January 26, Muller in his function as Reichsbishop and as
the Prussian state bishop, not only suspended Niemoller, but also issued a new decree intended to
"secure the unified leadership of the evangelical church in the Prussian Union." By February 2,
fifty pastors had been suspended based on violations of the "muzzling order." The secret police
began infiltrating church services, arresting pastors, and according toW. Niemoller, this was the
first time that pastors were sent to concentration camps. On February 3, MOller ordered that
pastors could be reassigned to other churches without notice. Pastors were also denied the right
to appeal those reassigments. Two days later, he disolved several high-ranking offices within the
Protestant church hierarchy (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 89-91 ).
While the German Christians and Reichsbishop Muller harrassed pastors, the Pastor
Emergency Association faced a major crisis. Many blamed Niemoller for causing the final breach
with Hitler. On January 29, the Council ofBrothers of the Pastors' Emergency Association met to
discuss the situation when Niemoller was arrested for further interrogation. Despite the arrest, the
meeting continued, and the council realized that they could not give up, no matter how dire the
RlLEY-H!CKI~JGBOTHAM

LIBRAf

Klarhorst 16
future seemed. Another meeting held two days later included not only council members, but also
local church representatives. They decided to draft letters to the renegade state bishops in which
they reproached the bishops and to Reichsbishop Muller in which the council members expressed
their intent to keep fighting for the right to preach the true Gospel (W. Niemoller, Der
Pfarrernotbund 56-58).
Even though the Council ofBrothers and the chosen representatives of the local churches saw
the need to continue with their resistance, it became obvious that it would be harder to do than
ever before. Many pastors removed themselves from the membership roll of the Pastors'
Emergency Association. Some no longer considered Niemoller as an appropriate representative of
their views, and others felt that they had to obey their state bishops and follow the lead those men
had taken on January 27. The Pastors' Emergency Association's membership dropped from over

.

seven thousand to just over five thousand (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarremotbund 58). A newspaper
article dated February 10, announced the decision of the state bishops and hailed it as a triumph
for the German Christians. Interestingly enough it misrepresented the facts when it stated that
"the leaders of the Pastors' Emergency Association .. . renounce explicitly any further opposition
against the Reichsbishop" (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 60). The article does not mention
that the state bishops were only allies and not the officially elected leaders of the Pastors'
Emergency Association.
Another event that had taken place on January 30 seemed to lend credibility to the
newspaper's claim. The church leadership in the state of Wiirtemberg had followed an invitation
of the political police and came to an agreement which included dissolving the Pastors' Emergency
Association in that state, as well as giving up the right to critique any decisions regarding the
restructuring of the German Evangelical Church. State Bishop Wurm had never officially been a
member of the Pastors' Emergency Association; therefore, he had no right to agree to dissolving it
in his state. Yet, that particular detail was never mentioned in public. The members of the
association in Wiirtemberg were informed on February 2, that the "Pastors' Emergency
Association dissolved itself on demand of the political police in order to avoid being dissolved;
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however, the association had not given up on its desire to do theological work renewing the
church in accord with the Gospel" (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 65). The agreement did
not become the victory the German Christians had claimed, even though it did do some damage.
By March 13, State Bishop Wurm changed his opinion regarding the agreement (W. Niemoller,

Der Pfarrernotbund 61-66).
On March 17, Muller published the '"Good Friday Message"'which received a strong rebuke
from the Westphalian Brotherhood. The brotherhood responded, on behalf of 500 Westphalian
pastors, on April 5 with their message "Our word to the congregations," to the main points in
Muller's attack (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 72). Muller had begun his message by calling
"the pastors under the cross of Christ to examine themselves" (Unser Wort an die Gemeinden 2).
The brotherhood condemned the fact that Muller chose the public media to spread his message,

.

and that he made it sound as if the openness for dialogue was entirely on the Reichbischop's side.
Muller had asked for the Confessional Church to "'bring its tongue as a sacrifice to Christ's cross
and to refrain from defaming the eighth commandment"' (Unser Wort an die Gemeinden 2). One
ofMuller's accusations, which hurt members of the Confessional Church the deepest, had been
that they "wanted to be holier than the Lord himself' (Unser Wort and die Gemeinden 2). Despite
laying blame for the church struggle solely at the Confessional Church's door, "Muller had
claimed to have been pressured to offer amnesty," according to the Westphalian Brotherhood, a
fact which surprised the Confessional Church, which asked in response "why they who serve
responsibly in the church should ask for amnesty" (HA 2/39-69, fax 2). Obviously Muller had
also blamed the National Socialists for the confusion in the church, because the Westphalian
Brotherhood pointed out that it was the German Christians who continually caused problems in
the church and not the government. Muller had ordered the pastors to keep focused on their own
congregations, an order the Westphalian Brotherhood refused on grounds that it was impossible to
care for one's local congregation when methods of the church leadership advanced the decay of
congregations and not their growth. Finally, Muller had argued that confessing Christ was not at
the center of the controversy but the necessity for order, to which the Westphalian Brotherhood
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replied that confessing Christ was exactly what the church struggle was all about (Unser Wort an

die Gemeinden 2-3).
The rebuttal of the Westphalian Brotherhood, which helped refortify the position of the
Pastors' Emergency Association (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 72), as well as the position of
the Confessional Church, was not the only visible support the weary pastors and members of both
organizations received. Unexpected support from the international church community encouraged
the Pastor's Emergency Association. The link between the Association and the international
community was predominantly Dietrich Bonhoeffer. In July of 1931 , Bonhoeffer had met Karl
Barth, the Swiss theologian whose work he had first encountered in 1924 (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer
27, 34). In September of 1931, Bonhoeffer represented Germany during the "'World Alliance'
conference in Cambridge," England where he was appointed as "one of three secretaries for
ecumenical work amo?g the youth, responsible for mid and northern Europe" (E. Bethge,

Bonhoeffer 35). In the course of working for the World Alliance he met "George Bell, the bishop
of Chichester, [and] at that time president ofLife and Work," another international group devoted
to ecumenical work (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 6). Both men became close friends in the following
years, and World Alliance as well as Life and Work would later publicly support the Confessional
Church (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 36). In March of 1934, Bell "wrote a letter to the publisher of the
"'Times"' informing the British public of the problems in the German Protestant Church and that
despite claims of the German government these problems had caused tension with the international
evangelical community (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 75). A declaration of solidarity signed
by 61 0 Swiss pastors and theologians helped boost the confidence ofNiemoUer and his friends
encouraging them to continue in new ways to reach their goals (W. Niemoller, Der

Pfarrernotbund 75).
The man most associated with developing strategies to reach these goals was Karl Immer, a
pastor in the city ofBarmen. He had encouraged members of the Pastors' Emergency Association
to establish synods throughout the country. One of the more important major synods had already
taken place in mid-February 1934 in Barmen (Rhineland). When the Council of Brothers of the
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Pastors' Emergency Association heard a report of the meeting by one of its attendees, it requested
to be accepted into the ranks of the synod. More synods followed, ultimately culminating in the
Synod of Barmen, which met from May 29 to 31 (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 76-80).
One more synod needs to be mentioned before turning the attention to Barmen. The Old Prussian
Union, which was totally opposed to the German Christians, and which had been on the frontlines
ever since the conflict had begun in the churches, held their synod on May 20, during which a
proposal for the organization of the future Confessional Church was made (W. Niemoller, Kampf

und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 123). It appears as if some aspects of the proposal were
later incorporated in the developing structure of the Confessional Church.
Nine days later "126 representatives of 18 Landeskirchen" (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis

der Bekennenden Kirche 123), met in Barmen where they were called to repent, to gather under
the word of God, and f1IOSt importantly to remember "the glory and uniqueness, as well as the
honor and the power of God's word" (W. Niemoller, Kampfund Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche
123). The synod concluded with several decisions and statements. First, the attendees decided to
establish a Council of Brothers representing all groups present including Lutherans and the
Reformed Church. Some names of the chosen members ofthe Council ofBrothers were familiar:
Martin Niemoller, Hans Asmussen, Karl Immer, and Gerhard Jacobi, among others. Second, the
synod categorically rejected Reichsbishop MOller and his colleagues declaring:
We deny that the current clerical regime of the German Evangelical Church has any legal
authority to reform the [church] constitution. Instead, we demand explicitly that it honors
the existing constitution. We declare that as long as the current clerical regime exists, we,
the Confessional Church, will fundamentally refuse any negotiations of questions
regarding the constitution. (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche
123)
In order to justify such a claim, a lawyer, Dr. Eberhard Fiedler, gave a lecture entitled an
"Explanation regarding the legal status of the confessional synod of the German Evangelical
Church." Fiedler pointed out just why the current church leadership had no right to be in a
leadership position (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 123).
Even though clarification of the legal status was important, there was something more
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important that happened in Barmen. The third statement was the theological declaration of
Barmen which consisted of six basic tenets developed by Karl Barth. The first tenet affirmed,
based on scripture, that Jesus Christ is the only revelation of God . The second tenet pointed to
Jesus Christ as the only means of salvation and that there are no areas in a person's life that are
excepted from the need of sanctification. The third tenet affirmed the role of the church in society
and that its center should be Jesus Christ alone. The fourth tenet denied special powers to church
leaders. The fifth tenet rejected the idea that the roles of church and state could be interchanged.
And finally, the sixth tenet affirmed that the Gospel should spread freely and that God cannot be
forced to act according to the will ofhuman beings (EKD: Glaube aktuelli-3). It can be argued
that the Barmen declaration was very important to the development of the Confessionial Church.
In future years it would act like a plumb line against which other declarations, ideas and
phiJosopies would be measured. Wilhelm Niemoller quotes Professor D. Arthur Cochrane of

.

Dubuque, "'It is my firm conviction that the Barmen Declaration is the most significant Church
document that has appeared since Reformation Confessions and Catechismus of the 16th and 17th
centuries ... here speaks the voice of one, holy ecumenical church transcending national, racial
and denominational barriers! 111 (Westfalische Kirche im Kampj 32). Unfortunately, the unity that
Cochrane praises so highly would not last long.
The unity which signified the official birth of the Confessional Church is attributed to Pastor
Hans Asmussen who introduced the theological declaration to the synod without political
innuendo. No matter where the attendees stood regarding politics, Asmussen made sure that the
declaration and its implications were understood within only theological parameters. Barth and
Bonhoeffer would distance themselves from this non-political attitude later. According to Bethge,
it is the main reason why Bonhoeffer would eventually choose to become involved in an
unsuccessful conspiracy to stop Hitler (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 53). There were a few who
considered their denominational differences too great to be reconciled and chose to disagree with
the union of the denominations, but they were not numerous enough to threaten the sense of unity
among the participants of the synod (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche
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126).
Many, unlike Barth and Bonhoeffer, were comfortable with the theological declaration, and "it
did not take long before young theologians would use it as the basis of their commitment at the
time of their ordination" (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 127). A
small group of Bavarian theologians tried to discredit the Barmen declaration, with an article
published on June 11 . In their opinion the six tenets were not Lutheran enough. They confirmed
in their article that Hitler was a pious, genuine Christian worthy of their support. The publication
did not dampen the spirit of those who had attended Barmen, but the German Christians tried to
make the most of it in the media (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche
131).
This minor attack was mild compared to what followed later. While the Confessional Church

.

was growing, August Jager, who had already caused problems in Prussia as the state's
commissioner, had been appointed in April to more powerful offices extending his authority
beyond Prussia's borders. His attempts to bring "peace and order" to the German Evangelical
Church were ruthless and not at all peaceful (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 81).
Only a couple of weeks later, another attack was launched against the Pastors' E mergency
Association, which continued to exist as a separate entity, though it was also part of the
Confessional Church. The State Bishop ofNassau-Hessen outlawed the organization in that state.
Members from everywhere in the country supported the harrassed pastors in Nassau-Hessen with
letters of encouragement and the attempt to ban the group failed . However, some of the pastors
caved in under the pressure and withdrew their membership. Further attacks by the state bishop
followed, but were not successful except in only a few individual cases (W. Niemoller, Der

Pfarrernotbund 82-88).
An additional widespread attack launched at the Landeskirchen was that almost all of them
were "incorporated" (gleichgeschaltet) into one big group that was controlled by the German
Christians. The attack began in early March and ended successfully in late July. Only the states of
Wiirtemberg, Hanover, and Bavaria could avoid the Gleichschaltung, which centralized the
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administration of all theLandeskirchen in the country. The Council ofBrothers ofthe
Confessional Synod protested sharply, but without any success (W. Niemoller, Der

Pfarremotbzmd 89). When the next synod met in Dahlem, on October 20, it became obvious that
times had gotten harder than ever before. According to a report published during the synod, 1,043
measures had been taken against pastors. These measures included disciplinary actions,
suspensions, prohibition to preach, forced reassignments, forced retirement, suspension from
higher clerical offices, reprimands, fines, and salary cuts among others (W. Niemoller, Der

Pfarremotbund 90-91 ).
The Pastors' Emergency Association kept a low profile during this time, according to a letter
by Martin Niemoller. He pointed out in Circular Letter No. 17:
... the Council ofBrothers in the individual confessional synods inform their members
about the status quo and necessary tasks within the Confessional Church. The leadership
of the Association is in close contact with the confessional synods. This practice proved
sufficient and allowed the Association to concentrate on supporting members who had
been disciplined. (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarremotbund 91)
The Pastors' Emergency Association was fortunate that it had many friends among lawyers and
court officials on local and state levels. With the help of these Christian men, the Association was
able to help represent members in court successfully. Some of those men paid a heavy price. Dr.
Hans Buttersack, a founding member of the Confessional Church in Nassau-Hessen who
fought not only for the church, but who also represented Jews in court, was sent to the
concentration camp in Dachau where he died. Dr. Hans Koch, who represented Martin Niemoller
in court, was shot by the Secret Police without a valid court ruling (W. Niemoller, Der

Pfarrernotbund 93-94).
The problems for the Confessional Church did not end. "A state of emergency was declared
for the church" (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 131) by Reichsbishop MOller which gave him the right to
interfere wherever he saw an emergency in the Landeskirchen (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis

der Bekennenden Kirche 132). The participants of the Dahlem Synod, hosted by and exclusively
attended by members of the Confessional Church, declared a state of emergency within the church
itself based on the events during the last year and "the first article of the church constitution of
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July 11 , 1933" (yl. Niemoller, Kampfund Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 132). They outlined
a new form of church government which proved impossible to work because it included a
"weakness" in the filing system of official documents which created a loophole between the
church's and government's bureaucracies allowing the opposition to tum the interpretation of the
article in question in either direction (y/. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der B ekennenden Kirche
184-187).
On November 22 a provisional church leadership was established (W . Niemoller, Kampf und

Zeugnis der Bekennenden K irche 191) which consisted of the Confessional Church and "the
churches ofBavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover" (<i>Britannica.com<i> 1), and which "should
seek support from the government and demand recognition of its authority and representation of
the German Evangelical Church for only a limited period of time" (yl. Niemoller, Der

Pfarrernotbund 95).

~t

that time the German Christians were firmly in control of the

government-favoring "German Evangelical Church, a federation formed in 1933 ofLutheran,
Reformed, and United territorial churches" (<i>Britannica<i> 1). It is questionable how this new
leadership tried to gain recognition from a political and clerical government that had proven so
hostile in the past. Instead of furthering the cause for the unification of the church and solving
differences, it added to the problems.
One result of that decision of forming the new provisional leadership, consisting of members
of the Confessional Church and representatives of the Landeskirchen of Bavaria, Hanover and
Wurtemberg, was that Hermann Albert Hesse, Karl Immer, and Martin Niemoller resigned from
the Reichsbruderrat (a newly founded council made up of six members of the council of the
German Evangelical Church). That decision increased the difference between those around Martin
Niemoller, the radical Dahlemites and the more moderate members of the Confessional Church.
Now Niemoller, Hans Asmussen, Friedrich Muller were synonymous with the words "radical,"
"persevering," and "uncompromising" (y/. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis d.er Bekennenden

Kirche 189). The provisional leadership crumbled after just one year because of its inability to
refrain from compromising the goals set during the Dahlem synod (W. Niemoller, Der
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Pjarrernotbund 95). It is of interest to note that Dahlem was in that region of the country that
was under the control of the Old Prussian Union which had been from the beginning a very strong
fighter against the German Christians. One cannot help but wonder ifMartin Niemoller could
have thrived and been able to be as radical if he had been in a region that was relatively weak in its
fight against the new church government.
As if the internal troubles within the Confessional Church were not enough, the government
added a new measure to ensure more problems in the future for the Confessional Church and any
organization or individual who did not agree with the current political leadership. When Hitler
and his staff issued the Heimtuckegesetz (Treachery Law) on December 20, they effectively
increased their control and power to silence people who were opposed to their leadership. The
wording of the law was rather ambiguous and allowed for a wide range of interpretation. It

.

basically meant that a person who made derogatory comments about the government and its
officials, as well as the NSDAP party itself and its associated organizations, could be either fined
or sent to jail. If a person committed a crime wearing a uniform or ensignia of the NSDAP they
could be punished with at least six months in prison. If the deed was committed with the intention
of causing a riot, inducing fear in the population, or, even worse, giving the Third Reich negative
international media attention, the individual could be sentenced to anywhere from three years to
life in prison. Severe cases could result in the death penalty (Heimtuckegesetz 11/07/01).
Personal opinions opposing the government were considered equal to treason against the state and
the German nation, upsetting many pastors as their patriotism was questioned when they refused
to support the Nazis.
The end of 1934 brought good and bad news. Martin Niemoller was reinstated as pastor of
his church in Berlin-Dahlem at the beginning ofDecember (W. Niemoller, Der Pjarrernotbund
97), but Karl Barth, the main author of the Barmen Declaration, was suspended from his teaching
position and forced into retirement, just like many other university professors before him. Barth
returned to his native Switzerland trying to support the cause of the Confessional Church from the
city of Basel (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 229-231 ). His help
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would later result in controversy that did not really help the Confessional Church and would taint
his contributions to the Barmen Declaration in the eyes of many.

THE GERMAN AND CONFESSIONAL CHURCHES IN 1935-38
At the beginning of 1935, Martin Niemoller and members of the Pastors' Emergency
Association still kept a low profile, using the time to regroup and rethink their position. It was
decided that pastors who were associated with the Confessional Church had to join the Pastors'
Emergency Association in order to be eligible for financial help by the association. In turn,
members of the Pastors' Emergency Association were asked to do everything possible to further
the cause of the Confessional Church in their local churches (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund
97).

The situation arol!nd the Confessional Church became tense again in early March when the
Old Prussian Union held their second synod in Dahlem. The participants' message was very direct.
We see our nation (Volk) threatened by a deadly danger. The danger is a new religion.
The church has the order of its Lord to watch that our nation (Volk) gives Christ the
honor which is due him as the judge of the world. The church knows that it will be held
accountable by God, if [the church] allowed the nation (Volk) to turn its back on Christ
without warning. (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 98)
This message was read by many pastors across the nation, despite the fact that those suspected or
known to be members of the Pastors' Emergency Association were visited by the Gestapo to
inform them that the message was not to be read in public. Seven hundred and fifteen pastors,
including Martin Niemoller and Gerhard Jacobi, were arrested after disregarding the Gestapo's
warning. The pastors in the Rhineland and Westphalia provinces decided to delay their reading of
the message and therefore eluded the Gestapo. The most disconcerting fact about this incident in
March 1935 was not so much the number of arrests, but rather the fact that the police and

Gestapo and no longer the regional and national church authorities punished the pastors.
Punishments for belligerent pastors were drastically increased and more severe than ever. Pastors
were banned from speaking, ordered to leave their churches, arrested, or even deported to
concentration camps. Because of their plight, churches nationwide began to hold special prayer
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services for pastors and prayed for them by name (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 98-99).
The Confessional Church did not limit its efforts to prayer alone. In late May representatives
of regional churches met in Bad Oeynhausen to identify problems within the churches and to
discuss strategies for solving those problems. The Confessional Church held their third synod at
Augsburg from June 4-6. Since problems with the areas of responsibilities between the provisional
church leadership and the Reichsbruderrat had been solved in mid-May, Martin Niemoller, Karl
Immer and Hermann Albert Hesse had rejoined the council and were listed as three of the 120
participants. Although the synod addressed issues like training new pastors and assignment of
areas of responsibilities of the provisional church leadership and the Reichsbruderrat, it failed to
address the measures the government had taken against the churches (W. Niemoller, Der
Pfarrernotbund 100, Kampfund Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 233-235). It is questionable
why the participants ayoided the topic of government persecution. Perhaps they considered the
topics they did discuss as more under their control and probable to solve than the issue concerning
the government.
In July it became obvious for Martin Niemoller that the provisional church leadership was
failing. Inviting more than 50 members of the Pastors' Emergency Association, he voiced what all
of them felt: "We are in a state of confusion and harmlessness. We need clear directions to avoid
turning in a dangerous direction" (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 101). Bonhoeffer who had
come from Finkenwalde, where he led one of the first seminaries founded by the Confessional
Church, was especially critical about the fact that the synod at Augsburg had not addressed the
Aryan paragraph and other recent political decisions. The meeting ended with the writing of a
letter to all pastors reminding them of the demands made in Barmen and Dahlem (W. Niemoller,
Der Pfarrernotbund 102).
The Reichsbruderrat (National Council of Brothers) of the Pastors' Emergency Association
met in August discussing strategies to re-organize the church on both national and local levels.
They hoped restructuring would bring order to the chaotic church landscape. The members ofthe
Reichsbruderrat agreed that the Pastors' Emergency Association should become a brotherhood for
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all pastors ofthe Confessional Church, which meant the latter needed to officially join the former.
Many in the provisional church leadership considered the Pastors' Emergency Association too
dangerous because of its association with Martin Niemoller; therefore, the suggestions of the
Reichsbruderrat went untested (yv . Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 105-106).
In October the church's landscape changed again. Two committees were established, one for
the national level and one for the regional level of the Landeskirchen. The members affirmed
National Socialistic ideas and did not address the declarations of Barmen and Dahlem. Moderate
Christians expected these committees to solve the problems in the church and to bring order.
Even some members of the Pastors' Emergency Association held such a conviction and withdrew
their financial support from the organization--a financial support that was needed more than ever
to help those pastors who had been suspended, fined or jailed for being a member of the Pastor's
Emergency Associati<:n (yv. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 106-1 07).
The year 1936 began with squabbles centering on the new church commitees. Squabbling
over doctrinal issues and threatened by old fears of regionalism, the Confessional Church began to
fall apart (Shelley Baranowski, Betrayal 98) which became very obvious during the fourth synod
of the German Evangelical Church hosted by the Confessional Church, which took place in Bad
Oeynhausen in mid-February: Neither group attending was willing to come together and make a
concerted effort to become a unified body. Each group insisted on "going about their business in
their own way" (yv. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 108), resulting in a fragmentation ofthe
Confessional Church that robbed it of its strength. Eventually the tension within the Confessional
Church would also reach the Pastors' Emergency Association and add to the burden the
organization already carried (yv. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 108). The Provisional Church
Leadership, associated with the Confessional Church, obviously failed during this time completely,
since Bethge points out that a second Provisional Church Leadership was established in February
(E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 133).

Many Landeskirchen faced severe problems during 1936. Attempts to limit the rights of state
bishops to the realm of "preaching and official duties" (yv. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der
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Bekennenden Kirche 352) failed . The regional committee in Nassau-Hessen, for example, had
been established for the fourth time, and each time it was obvious that the members appointed
were considered appropriate choices by the government rather by individual pastors. The
Confessional Church in Pommem faced complete destruction by the regional

committee~

the same

was true for the churches in Silesia and Westphalia. During the Silesian synod in Naumburg which
took place from July 1-4, participants argued over who had ultimate authority in the church. They
agreed on the following which ended their declaration: "Only the church has the order to separate
true and false doctrine.--Only the church is supposed to watch and decide about its organization
and its offices.--Only the church has the authority to call appropriate church members to serve in
those offices" (y/. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 3 57) . The Naumburg
declaration followed the general outline of its predecessors ofBarmen and Dahlem; however, most

.

of the German Christians and church members involved could not handle its implication and were
therefore very upset to be reminded that the problem of the German Protestant Church had not
been solved yet (W. Niemoller, Kampfund Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 357).
By the end of April the Prussian Bn1derrat, associated with the Confessional Church, planned
a "visitation program" lasting from May to June in order to strenghen the unity among individual
churches in those provinces and regions that had the most problems. Each time two members of
the Old Prussian Union conducted a visitation, they focused their attention on updating the local
church members on the current status of the church struggle while gathering information on the
condition of the local confessional churches. From the gathered information it became more and
more obvious that the church committees had dealt the Confessional Church a crippling blow in all
visited regions (W. Niemoller, Kampfund Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 360-362).
The attempts to solve the problems within the Protestant churches lasted into the next year.
An announcement on February 15, 1937, promising new church elections for later in the year

caused the different factions within the Protestant Church to renew their ties, while "the
Provisional Church Leadership [associated with the Confessional Church] and the Council of
Germany's Protestant-Lutheran Church decided to join forces" and appointed members of both
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groups to represent the newly formed group, called Leadership of the German Evangelical Church
(W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 408-409).
However, the joint efforts of cooperation among the different church groups did not last long,
since the announced elections never took place. Obviously not everybody had been eager to
cooperate. The chairmen of the national church committees and non-German-Christian bishops
met at a conference without inviting either the Prussian Bruderrat or the Provisional Church
Leadership which were both closely linked to the Confessional Church, and set up a new church
government. The Prussian Bruderrat, speaking for the Confessional Church, denied the new
church leadership any legitimacy. The church committees collapsed one after another, in early
1937, as German Christians abandoned the committees like sinking ships when the news was
published that the Prussian Bruderrat, associated with the Confessional Church, had made a deal

.

with the government sponsored, regional church committee ofPrussia which gave the Prussian
Bruderrat a legal voice in Prussia's church affairs (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der
Bekennenden Kirche 408-409).
The fact that the non-German-Christian bishops agreed to set up a new church government
shows how confusing and fragmented the entire Protestant church landscape was at that time.
Neither group that vied for control or at least for their voice to be heard was able to gain a
majority. Cooperative efforts crumbled as soon as they were made, and most of the new offices
that were intended to improve church government failed miserably.
It is interesting to note that it was the Prussian Bruderrat and not the national Bruderrat that
made the deal with the Prussian church committee. The reason, according to Wilhelm Niemoller,
was very simple. The national Bruderrat had fallen apart after one final stand on June 23 when the
council met and decided to call on Protestant Christians not to attend the upcoming church
elections. Eight members of the national Bruderrat were arrested by the secret police when the
latter broke up the meeting (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 115).
Despite the victory the Prussian Bruderrat gained through its deal with the government
sponsored Prussian church committee, its members could not enjoy the fruits of their labor for
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long. The police arrested Martin Niemoller on July 1, 193 7, thus dealing a crippling blow to the
Bruderrat, the Pastors' Emergency Association, the Bruderrat of the Old Prussian Union and the
Council of the German Protestant Church--groups which listed Niemoller as one of their members.
While many raised their voices coming to Niemoller's defense, one voice remained silent, and
nothing could induce the representatives of the Lutheran churches to raise their voice for
Niemoller's case (yv. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 116-117).
Five days after Niemoller was incarcerated in the Moabit prison in Berlin, a clerical committee
was founded in Kassel. The different factions were the "conference of bishops, the Provisional
Church Leadership of the Confessional Church as well as the churches of the states ofBavaria,
Hanover, and Wiirtemberg, and the Council of Germany's Protestant-Lutheran Church" (yv.
Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennend.en Kirche 409). Their decision to cooperate was a

.

major breakthrough in the struggle to unite the Protestant church. Their message to the
churches in the whole country, written on August 20, spoke clearly of the disastrous situation of
the church and cited all the government's attacks that made the pastors' job to proclaim the Gospel
almost impossible. Despite its inflammatory content, the message was printed and distributed
without alerting government officials. However, this lapse of reaction by the government could
not cover up the fact that the Confessional Church was losing ground (yv. Niemoller, Kampf und
Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 409).
One of the heaviest losses the Confessional Church suffered during this time was the loss of
Karl Immer who had a stroke in prison. Even though he recovered somewhat, his strength was
minimal through the final few years of his life. Yet he remained influential and was hated by the
government for one particular letter he wrote to his children (yv. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis
der Bekennenden Kirche 413). According to Wilhelm Niemoller, "no other document of the
Confessional Church was as sought after" as the 'sunbeam-letter' in which Immer "told his children
about his experiences in prison" (yv . Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche
413). "Whoever was distantly involved with the copying and distribution of that letter was
arrested, threatened, interrogated and put under pressure" (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der
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Bekennenden Kirche 413).
The loss of leading men like Martin Niemoller and Karl bruner was not the only problem the
Confessional Church dealt with in the summer of 1937. More problems became known
soon enough at the Prussian Confessional Synod in Lippstadt where participants in late August
heard a whole litany of government restrictions that affected the church negatively (W. Niemoller,
Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 409). In September Himmler announced
that any pastor's training done at Confessional Church institutions was illegal (E. Bethge,
Bonhoe.ffer 133), a decision that denied young trainees the opportunity to learn a Gospel untainted
by German Christian theology. One of the results was that the police shut down the seminary in
Finkenwalde, where Dietrich Bonhoeffer had been teaching for a little over two years. However,
work continued in the underground until 1940, when it was discovered and shut down for a

.

second time. By that time many of its students had already been conscripted. Many of them died
in the war and did not return (Renate Bethge, Wunderbar geborgen: Dietrich Bonhoeffer 24).
Following the increased restrictions and persecution by the government, the Pastors'
Emergency Association spent the rest of 193 7 restructuring the organization, especially since one
of the main leaders, Martin Niemoller, remained in prison for the rest of the year. One of the
major changes was the decision to stop managing the finances and funds of the organization from
Berlin. When Niemoller had been arrested, the police confiscated not only his personal money but
also money belonging to the organization. Since it was a considerable sum, the financial structure
of the Pastors' Emergency Association was decentralized, giving authority to the provincial leaders
(W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 119-124).
The next major event in the history of the Pastors' Emergency Assocation, which also
impacted the Confessional Church, began on February 7, 1938. Martin Niemoller's trial began and
lasted for nineteen days. At the end he was punished with seven months in prison and several
fines. Since he had already spent time in prison, the only thing to do for him was to pay the fines-at least that was the court's verdict. In reality, Niemoller was taken to the concentration camp in
Sachsenhausen by the Gestapo on March 2, where he was imprisoned until July 11 , 1941 when he
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was sent to the concentration camp in Dachau, remaining there until the end of the war.
While Martin Niemoller was removed permanently from the church struggle, the fight against
the German Christians and the government's intrusion in church affairs continued. Pastors of the
Confessional Church were not allowed to travel or speak publicly--prohibitions which made it hard
for them to tend to the needs of their congregations (yl. Niemoller, Kampf und Bekenntnis der
Bekennenden Kirche 419).

At the occasion of the annexation of Austria, the Reichskirchenregierung (Reich church's
government) presented Hitler with a very special birthday gift in April of 1938. Every pastor was
ordered to swear an oath of loyalty to Hitler. In the beginning many pastors of the Confessional
Church refused, but later gave in since they argued that the government could request such an
oath. Interestingly enough it was argued later that neither the NSDAP nor the government was

.

really concerned about the pastors giving that oath. Dietrich Bonhoeffer had advocated against
the loyalty oath, yet his words had fallen on deaf ears (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 70).
As the summer passed and more and more pastors swore the loyalty oath, life for the Jews in
Germany became even more difficult than it had been. In August they were ordered to have
identification papers that marked them clearly as Jews, "an 'I'-- Israel for men and an 'S'--Sarah for
women" (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 70). This new law caused Bonhoeffer's twin sister and her Jewish
husband to leave Germany immediately. While Dietrich Bonhoeffer helped his sister and her
husband escape to England, Karl Barth surprised his friends among the Confessional Church with
a letter he wrote to "JosefHromadka, a theologian in Prague, Tschecheslowakia, calling for armed
resistance against Hitler's forces" (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 70). The Provisional Church
Leadership, as well as other leading members of the Confessional Church, decided that they had to
distance themselves from Barth in order to protect themselves and their organizations (E. Bethge,
Bonhoeffer 70). On September 27, the Provisional Church Leadership ordered a special prayer
church service in which the church asked for prayer that war might be avoided (E. Bethge,
Bonhoejjer 70). The media saw the church service in a different light arguing that participants had

used the event to fan the flames of disharmony and disunity among the German people (yl.
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Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 448).
In November "Jewish stores were looted, synagogues were burnt to the ground and almost the
entire male Jewish population was sent to concentration camps" (y.l. Niemoller, Kampf und

Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 457) after a young Jew killed a member of the German
ambassador's party in Paris. The persecution of Jews and Jewish Christians in Germany who were
blamed for the incident, increased to unprecedented heights (y.l. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis

der Bekennenden Kirche 457). About 26,000 Jewish youth were sent to concentrations camps in
Buchenwald, Dachau and Sachsenhausen. They would not be set free unless they declared
themselves willing to leave Germany. Furthermore, the Jewish population was ordered to pay a
lump sum of a billion Reichsmark as reparations. Jews' participation in public life was restricted
and limited in such a manner that it was impossible for them to live a normal life. By late January
1939, Goring would ~rder the Jews to be either evacuated or forced to leave the country

(Reichskristallnacht 1). Eberhard Bethge argued that the Confessional Church ceased to be
publicly effective after November 9, 1938 (Bonhoeffer 70), an assessment that seemed to be
confirmed by later accounts of Wilhelm Niemoller even though Dietrich Bonhoetfer in particular
had continually tried to remind the members of the Confessional Church of their responsibility
toward their Jewish friends.
The Confessional Church was hit hard during this time. Four members of the Provisional
Church Leadership faced disciplinary hearings. The Prussian Council of Brothers missed the
incarcerated Martin Niemoller's insight and the help ofKarl Lucking who was in exile. As a result
of the Reichskristallnacht, 97 members of the Confessional Church were hindered in the execution
oftheir duties, 11 members were prohibited from leaving the country, 39 members were prohibited
from visiting certain cities, 40 members were prohibited from speaking publicly, 48 members were
forced to leave their offices, and finally 2 members were expelled (y.l. Niemoller, A us dem Leben

eines Bekenntnispfarrers 240).
Despite these obstacles, the Confessional Church responded to these new outbursts of
violence and aggression during their meeting on December 10-12. Participants were called to
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follow the directions of scripture and to remember that Jewish Christians were their brothers and
sisters. Participants were also reminded that the Gospel was given to all people, including the
Jews and that therefore the church should not tum its back to the Jews in their time of need. One
result was that the Bruderrat of the Old Prussian Union, associated with the Confessional Church,
sent a message to all congregations with the request to pray faithfully for the Jewish Christians.
Many pastors who called their congregations back under the word of God and who dared to
critize the atrocities committed against the Jews became targets of hostilities themselves. They
were attacked and beaten, arrested and sent to regular prisons as well as to concentration camps
(W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 458-463).

THE GERMAN AND CONFESSIONAL CHURCHES IN 1939-1945

.

The Confessional Church held a synod on January 28, 1939 in Nikolasee, where pastors
"declared solidarity" with those pastors who had been trained by the Confessional Church. Since
Himmler had shut down their seminaries in the Fall of 1938, those trainees were considered to be
"illegals," especially if they actively served as pastors (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 133, W. Niemoller,

Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 441 ).
While some information is still available on the Confessional Church during this time, little has
survived about the activities of the Pastors' Emergency Association. According to Wilhelm
Niemoller, the organization increasingly spent money to help pastors with their living
expenses and legal assistance. Most of the tasks of the Pastors' Emergency Association were by
that time laid on Hermine Hermes, the organization's secretary and Dr. Wilhelm Jannasch,
the manager. Many of his colleagues, who had helped run the organization, had been conscripted
into the army by that time (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 142).
In early February the Protestant Church in Thtiringen, Eastern Germany, which was composed
of very radical German Christians, released new regulations that basically applied the Aryan
paragraph to the environment of the church and Jews were completely ostracized from church life.
In late February three more Protestant churches applied similar regulations in their regions. Even
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though the Confessional Church, according to Wilhelm Niemoller, tried to address the issue of the
Aryan-paragraph in the church, it never really made much of an impact. One of the last few times
that the church addressed this issue was when members of an organization called

Nationalkirchliche Einigung Deutsche Christen (National Church Unification German Christians)
which had formed a loose cooperation with other Protestant pastors, but not with the Confessional
Church, published the Godesberg Declaration in which it affirmed that Christianity and Judaism
were mutually exclusive. On April 4, 1939, eleven regional church leaders (Landeskirchenleiter)
agreed with the the Godesberg Declaration. Furthermore, they agreed to study how to remove
Jewish influences from churchlife and establish a church organization that would fight the
politizing of religion. The Prussian Council ofBrothers, associated closely with the Confessional
Church, ordered their response to the Godesberg Declaration to be read in the churches, accusing

.

especially the Thuringian German Christians for radically forcing Confessional Churches to yield
to the new theology. The regional councils of brothers (Landesbruderriite) pointed out in their
declaration that God himself had appointed Israel as his chosen people. Nothing anybody else
decided could change that, not even the Jews themselves, no matter how much they had refused in
their history to be God's people (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 457471).
Declarations like those above had almost no impact. In the same month the Protestant church
leadership in Prussia, associated with the German Christians, decided that every pastor in their
employ had to prove his Aryan heritage. If pastors could not do that, they were dismissed from
their duties. But not only non-Aryan pastors, whether Protestant or Confessional, faced hardships
during these days. In late March, Dr. Werner, President of the Protestant Church Council ofthe
old Prussian Union, though associated with the Confessional Church, decreed that the
appointment of a pastor was merely an administrative act. Congregations had neither rights
anymore to refuse a pastor assigned to them based on his beliefs or lifestyle, nor could pastors
refuse to serve a congregation they had been assigned to (W. Niemoller, Kampfund Zeugnis der

Bekennenden Kirche 460, 467).
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Pastors were not only burdened with restrictions, they were also actively hunted down.
Friedrich "Fritz" Muller, pastor in Dahlem, was officially convicted in March of 1939 of major
violations of conduct and suspended. One of the things that Muller was lacking, according to
accusations, was a proper attitude toward the war. In the written decision, the judges stated that
Muller's liturgies lacked for example "the request for victory in battle." Furthermore, the judges
argued that the focus on Old Testament theology with an emphasis of God punishing people with
war was inappropriate (y/. Niemoller, Kampfund Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 451-452).
Muller continued to fight for the needs of the Confessional Church despite his suspension and the
fact that he was no longer allowed to preach. He died of a heart attack in September 1942 while
serving as a soldier near Leningrad (y/. Niemoller, Lebensbilder aus der Bekennenden Kirche 80).
Meanwhile the German troops continued their attacks. They invaded Prague in mid-March

.

and Poland in early September after the German government had reached an agreement with
Russia. England declared war on Germany on September 3. Whether members of the
Confessional Church were still as eager to serve in the military as they were back in 193 5 when
Hitler issued a new conscription law might be questionable. However, since their patriotism had
been doubted severely in the past, it was quite possible that many went to war without second
thoughts (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 60-61, 133). Many of them would not return to their families,
but die in battle, effectively weakening the Confessional Church which not only lost members that
way, but also lost the grip on the churches those pastors had served--another very probable reason
why the Confessional Church became more and more a silent church.
Not every pastor died in the war. Wilhelm Niemoller, who was conscripted in late
August of 1939, survived the war and returned to his home church in Bielefeld six years later.
During his time in the military, he was able to minister to his fellow soldiers, but he could not
easily speak officially for the Confessional Church. He was banned from the pulpit in May of
1939. This ban was very hard not only for his home church, but also for his brother's church in
Dahlem, Berlin, where he had filled in as occasional pastor ever since Martin Niemoller had been
arrested and imprisoned (y/. Niemoller, A us dem Leben eines Bekenntnispfarrers 248-273).
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The war that began in 1939 continued to gain momentum in 1940 with the invasion of
Denmark and Norway in April and the invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg and
France in May. During all this time, the Confessional Church surely tried to be active and
effective, but according to Eberhard Bethge and Wilhelm Niemoller only silence came from the
Confessional Church during this time.
Occasionally the Confessional Church tried to break the silence, but was not very successful.
In October 1940 the ninth Prussian confessional synod met in Leipzig addressing especially the
issue of euthanasia without any major resolutions. Everyone seemed to have his own approach.
Pastor v. Bodelschwingh continually tried to protect his patients in the mental institutions in
Bethel near Bielefeld. Others chose a more direct approach. In a meeting in Hamm, Pastor Ernst
Wilm called for active protection and care for the mentally ill. He was arrested in 1942 and sent to

.

the concentration camp in Dachau. Unfortunately, on the whole, the Confessional Church was
painfully silent when it came to the issue of euthanasia (W. Niemoller, Westfalische Kirche im
Kampj 54-55).
In May of 1941 , twenty-three comittee members of the Confessional Church were arrested

and tried in December. In the same month bishop Wunn called for a unification of all Protestant
pastors. The final attempt of the Confessional Church occurred on October 16, 1943, in Breslau.
The main focus was the Fifth Commandment, cited to protest against the murder ofnon-Aryans
and those people deemed invaluable for society (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 133-135).
Undoubtedly, members of the Confessional Church continued in their own limited ways to
make a difference where they served during those last years of the war. But a united front and
workable cooperation between different groups was unfortunately no longer possible.
Wilhelm Niemoller describes the toll the war took on the Confessional Church in the province
of Westphalia alone. "Fifty pastors, 68 lay pastors, 26 candidates for the pastorate, and 15
theology students died in the line of duty. Sixteen pastors, 18 lay pastors, and one candidate for
the pastorate were missing" (W. Niemoller, Westfalische Kirche im Kampj 52). The mortal loss
of pastors leaft big gaps in the care of the congregations and hindered the effectiveness
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of the Confessional Church. "The frequent air raids and bombings that ruined many churches, the
loss of church bells and the loss of a real voice in the press all aided in the weakening and
consequent demise of the Confessional Church" (W. Niemoller, Westfalische Kirche im Kampf
52). Lutzer points out in his book, Hitler's Cross, that "Hitler always used a man's family as an
inducement for absolute obedience" (182). Many pastors who would have liked to be more
outspoken and more radical felt they had to practice restraint for the sake of their families.
(Lutzer, Hitler's Cross 182) Despite afflictions and fear, the pastors and members ofthe
Confessional Church tried to do their best in those places where they were. The ways the men
served differed greatly.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer became involved in a conspiracy against Hitler because of the close
connections with his brother-in-law Hans v. Dohnanyi. Bonhoeffer had an opportunity to escape
the war unharmed when he went to New York in June of 1939~ yet, his conscience forced him to

.

return to Germany after just one month. From then on his involvement in the conspiracy grew
consistantly. When the Gestapo made his life miserable again with prohibitions against speaking,
and required that he show up at the local police station in regular intervals, his brother-in-law
arranged his transfer to Munich with the help of another conspirator, Hans Oster, a colonel in the
military defense department. Even during this time, Bonhoeffer never severed his ties with the
Confessional Church, but his views were frowned upon by many. Ultimately, the conspiracy was
discovered. Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Hans v. Dohnanyi and their wives were arrested on April 5,
1943. The women were soon released, but the men stayed in prison and were joined in October
by Bonhoeffer's brother, Klaus, and their friends, RUdiger Schleicher and Eberhard Bethge, who
had tried to help Bonhoeffer and Dohnanyi to break out of prison. On April 9, 1945, Dietrich
Bonhoeffer and other conspirators, including Hans Oster, were hung in the concentration camp of
FlossenbUrg. Hans von Dohnanyi was very likely killed on the same day in the concentration camp
of Sachsenhausen. Klaus Bonhoeffer and RUdiger Schleicher were killed by an SS commando on
April23, 1945 (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 88-100, 132-134).
Another valuable member of the Confessional Church, Karl Immer, the author of the
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"sunbeam" writings who had fought side-by-side with Martin Niemoller, was responsible during
the church war for spreading the word of the Confessional Church by whatever means possible.
His resourcefulness to get the decisions of the numerous synods printed and passed out had
fiutstrated his opponents. He was arrested in AugustS, 1937, and imprisoned in Berlin. A stroke
which he suffered six days later left him physically severely impaired. Despite his physical frailty,
he continued to serve the Confessional Church for seven more years until he died in May 1944 (W.
Niemoller, Lebensbilder aus der Bekennenden Kirche 69-73 ).
A close friend of Karl Immer was Paul Humburg who served as official leader of the
Confessional Church in the Rhineland and then later served as a member of the provisional church
government. One of his ministries was to young theology students. His responsibilites included
the preparations of their examination according to the beliefs of the Confessional Church. His

.

activites attracted the attention of the Gestapo. Repeated arrests and interrogation weakened him
and he was forced to resign from all his offices. Suffering from increasing blindness and the loss
of a leg, he died in May 1945 and was buried by the side ofhis friend, Karl Immer (W. Niemoller,

Lebensbilder aus der Bekennenden Kirche 54-62).
Once the war was lost, remnants of the Confessional Church issued a declaration at Stuttgart
on October 19, 1945, accepting part of the guilt ofwhat had happened in Germany. The
Westphalian Church issued the same type of statement for their province on July 20, 1946.
We confess that we as members of the church have sinned against God. The Lord of the
church had given us in the church struggle clear insights during the confessional synods.
We have often acted against those insights and withdrawn from them. We loved our own
security more than we loved our Lord, Jesus Christ. We were all too gullible in the
beginning and did not see through the national socialism that made the nation (Volk) into
an idol. We did not speak up loud enough aginst the annihilation of the Jews and other
condemned people. We resisted less and less against the totalitarian influence so that our
view of the living Lord dimmed. We were confused in arrogance, cowardly in love, and
weak in faith . We hoped for help from people, instead of help from God:
We reject to speak of other people's guilt without confessing our own.
We admonish our brothers and sisters to examine themselves before God for any guilt
of their own. (W. Niemoller, Westphiilische Kirche im Kampj 58-59)
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CONCLUSION
Considering the remarks of the Westphalian Church, it becomes obvious that the Confessional
Church did not die after all, but was forced into silence instead. Despite the fact that the church
condemned itself for having been silent and ineffective, it cannot be denied that men like Martin
Niemoller, Fritz Miiller-Dahlem, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and all the others who are less known today
gave their best efforts to restore the Protestant church to a purer, more Christ-centered institution.
A great deception, testing and sifting took place in the German Church during the Third
Reich. Hitler was very careful at first to hide his real intentions. His early speeches revealed
nothing but willingness to cooperate with the churches. His true beliefs about Christianity were
revealed slowly in the steps he took quietly to irradicate religion from the life of the German
people beginning with the youth by drawing them to Hitler Jugend meetings rather than to church,
and forbidding religio~ to be taught in school. This is one reason why the German Christians
bought into Hitler's agenda. They hoped for a united German church. Since they could not
acheive their goals themselves they relied on the help from the Nazis, who were only too happy to
lend assistance, knowing full well that as soon as the church was fragmented into different
factions, it would no longer pose a threat to the Nazi's cause.
Christians were tested and the chaff was separated from the wheat. Every Christian had
eventually to ask where he/she stood regarding a personal faith in Jesus Christ. Was it the Christ
of the Bible or the Fuhrer of the German nation? Pastors and church leaders, who were naturally
more in the spotlight than the average citizen, had to face particular difficulties. They faced
increasing difficulties in taking care of their congregations, including limited resources, restrictions
preaching, intimidation, interrogations, prison and suspension. The ability to communicate with
like-minded colleagues for encouragement and support was restricted as well, leading to a sense of
isolation and weariness. But despite these hardships they tried to preach a pure Gospel.
One question that arises is whether there would have been a rethinking, refocusing on Christ
as the center of theology among pastors and churches without something as aggravating as Hitler's
national socialism. A second question is what would have happened if men like Niemoller, Muller-
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Dahlem, and Bonhoeffer had been less ractical. As shown in the paper, it was the Dahlemites, the
men around Niemoller and MtilJer-Dahlem, who constantly reminded the Protestant and
Confessional Churches of the declaration ofBarmen. A refocusing took place whenever these
men sensed that the church was turning in the wrong direction or weakened in its efforts.
Bonhoeffer died for his beliefs, beliefs he hammered out during his short life. The impact of his
martyrdom cannot be underestimated for the generations of Christians in Germany that followed .
Gehard Leipholz once wrote about Dietrich Bonhoeffer, his brother-in.-law: "He has set a model
for a new type of true leadership inspired by the gospel, daily ready for martyrdom and death and
imbued by a new sprit ofChristain humanism and a creative sense of civic duty" (Bonhoeffer, The

Cost of Discipleship, ''Memoirs" 33). Bonhoeffer practiced what he believed, that "he who
believes is obedient [ ... and] that only he who is obedient believes" (Bonhoeffer, The Cost of

.

Discipleship 64) and set an example for every Christian to contemplate.
By no means is this to be understood as a condemnation ofthose men who felt a need to
protect their families. Undoubtedly such a decision caused many of them much grief and pain, but
not everybody was and is cut out to be a martyr. And fear was ever present for all people not just
pastors, but alJ people. One lady, who witnessed the horrors of the war as a child, shared this little
story during an inpromptu interview: Her father had been employed in the printshop of Pastor v.
Bodelschwingh, the former Reichsbishop, in Bethel near Bielefeld. As laws regarding printed
material tightened, there was less and less to print, and also greater fear of possessing prohibited
material, especialJy from the Confessional Church. This lady witnessed that an old man, in his late
seventies or early eighties, who lived in the same house, was picked up by the Gestapo for
interrogation and his place searched for prohibited material from the Confessional Church. Her
last comment on the incident was this, "But, of course, you understand, everybody was afraid.
You did not talk about it, that was too dangerous. It could get you killed to talk about that"
(Klarhorst, Heidi interview).
Martin Niemoller survived prison and concentration camps, but he paid nonetheless a heavy
price for his engagement in the church struggle. He was called an enemy of the German people
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which bothered him after having been a World War I veteran (Martin Niemoller, Briefe aus der

Gefangenschaft Moabi/39). While in Sachsenhausen, he spent four years in solitary confinement
as '"prisoner of the Fuhrer,"' from which he would be released only to be moved to a concentration
camp in Dachau, where he was held until the war was over (Martin Niemoller, Briefe aus der

Gejangenschaft: Konzentrationslager Sachsenhausen 8). Martin Niemoller is intimately linked
with the church struggle and many have heard at least his name, but he is only representative of
thousands who tried to make a difference and bring the people back to a Christ-centered theology.
One issue where guilt is less pardonable is the fact that many members of the Confessional
Church held no strong convictions against the Aryan-paragraph. In this regard they carried
considerable guilt which cannot be blotted out by the fact that many tried to help the Jews once it
became apparent that the National Socialists indeed planned to annihilate the Jews. And yet who
else but the church st?od in the way of the Nazis except a few brave individuals like the Scholl
siblings, if not the Confessional Church?
In conclusion, it can be said that considering the odds Niemoller, Bonhoeffer and the others
faced, they gave their best efforts to proclaim Jesus Christ as Lord. Once they understood the
implications of the new religion and the idea that Hitler was supposed to be the new savior of the
German people, they tried everything they could to help the church refocus on Christ. The
Confessional Church, despite its shortcomings and limitations, did valuable work drawing the
German people back to Christ, foiling the attempts of the National Socialists and making it
difficult for the Nazis and the German Christians to paganize the churches.
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Definitions ofT erms
Church Struggle-

the conflict among the different factions within the Protestant Church
regarding organization, leadership, and church politics (especially the
influence of government in the church)

Confessional
Church

church that resisted the paganization and intrusion of the Protestant Church
by the Nazis and the German Christians; main supporters: Martin Niemoller,
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Karl Immer, Hans Asmussen, and Karl Barth

Deutsche
Christen

German Christians, supported the Nazi's agenda for the Protestant Church

Landeskirchen -

regional churches that have a central clerial government in a state

Pfarrernotbund -

Pastors' Emergency Association, an organization founded by Martin
Niemoller to connect and assist pastors in their duties, anti-nazi and antiGerman Christians

Protestant
Church

main religious group in Germany that is often also refered to as Lutheran, and
Evangelical, which however differs from what Americans think of when they
hear those terms

Reichsbishop

highest of all German bishops and head of the Protestant Church

Reichsbruderrat-

Council ofBrothers on national level, included members of the Confessional
Church as well as other groups, but no German Christians

Vorkiufige
Provisorische
Leitung

Provisional Church Leadership, a form of government that included members
of various Protestant groups, but no German Christians; a weak organization
that tended toward moderation and was weary of the Pastors' Emergency
Association
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